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Privatisation and ethno-regional protest in Cameroon 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Privatisation has become a cornerstone of the good governance-structural adjustment linkage formu-
lated by western donors and creditors. This case study of Cameroon, however, clearly shows that pri-
vatisation schemes have often failed to promote any transparency and accountability in public-sector 
reforms or to encourage greater participation of civil society in the decision-making process. Privati-
sation schemes have instead frequently led to vehement protests from ethno-regional organisations, 
particularly when they have felt excluded from the sale of vital regional public enterprises to well-
placed nationals or to foreign-owned enterprises.  
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Introduction 
 
Privatisation has become a key instrument in the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and 
the good governance agenda imposed on Africa by the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral 
donors. It is an essential part of the overall neo-liberal reform package aimed at creating trans-
parency and accountability in the management of national affairs as well as a favourable environ-
ment for opening up the Cameroonian economy to market forces and private-sector develop-
ment. 
 Since public enterprises are considered to have performed dismally, African governments 
are under considerable pressure from international donors to sell them off to domestic and 
foreign private investors. Several authors, however, have observed that the actual number of 
privatisations has remained modest in Africa (cf. Bennell 1997; Tangri 1999; Van de Walle 
2001). They point to various technical and financial constraints as well as to socio-political influ-
ences to explain this curious finding. Interestingly, some factors reflect the same political con-
cerns that led to the creation of so many public enterprises in the years after independence: an 
inability to attract foreign investment to politically and economically unstable African nations, the 
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absence of a well-developed domestic entrepreneurial class, and the pursuit of patron-client 
relationships by African ‘neo-patrimonial’ states. Some authors also highlight the resistance to 
privatisation by civil society, in particular by professional bodies, student organisations and trade 
unions, since privatisation often involves the sale of public property to well-placed nationals or to 
foreign enterprises, and generally results in massive lay-offs of workers (cf. Olukoshi 1998; 
Konings 2002). 
 Strikingly, in sharp contrast to the existing literature, international donors are inclined to 
blame almost exclusively the weak, predatory and neo-patrimonial African states for the poor 
performance of structural adjustment in general and public-sector reforms in particular and they 
stress the need not only for less but also for better government in Africa. By proclaiming that a 
‘crisis of governance’ underlies ‘the litany of Africa’s development problems’, the World Bank’s 
1989 report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth placed the concept of good 
governance at the heart of the donor agenda for Africa (World Bank 1989: 60).  
 But what is good governance and how is it to be promoted? The term remains rather 
vague. The World Bank (1992: 1) defines it in managerial terms as ‘the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of the country’s economic and social resources for development’. 
Good governance was to flow from enhanced accountability within the public sector, transparency 
and openness in decision-making, the rule of law, and more efficient public management (Sand-
brook 2000: 10-13). The bilateral donors, however, soon linked democracy to good governance. 
Although they continuously stressed that democratisation had its intrinsic merits, they undoubt-
edly saw it primarily as an instrument for promoting the more efficient implementation of struc-
tural adjustment measures. Democratisation was said to empower the electorate by providing it 
with mechanisms of a parliamentary and extra-parliamentary nature to check upon the ruling 
regime’s neo-patrimonial practices and to participate in the decision-making process about 
necessary structural adjustment measures. This would contribute to the legitimisation of unpopu-
lar neo-liberal reforms among the population. 
  Clearly, the good governance discourse, propagated by the donor community generally 
and the World Bank in particular, represents an instrumentalist, managerial and technocratic 
approach to development. It aims at promoting the emergence of a more conducive and, in their 
view, more legitimate political environment, backed by the requisite administrative capacity, for 
the successful implementation of orthodox structural adjustment (Olukoshi 1998: 35). This ap-
proach entails an essentially depoliticised notion of governance. In my study of privatisation in 
Cameroon, I argue instead that the good governance-structural adjustment linkage, though 
largely framed in managerial and technical terms, is highly political, being embedded in particular 
relations of power, and contested. Ironically, it often contradicts the liberal-democratic principles 
prescribed by bilateral donors. 
  Decisions about privatisation in Cameroon are taken by the Bretton Woods institutions 
and implemented after secret consultations with a small group of national technocrats represent-
ing the government. Power, in other words, is increasingly located outside the political community 
as conventionally defined by democratic theory, and beyond the reach of the democratic control 
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of Cameroonian citizens (Abrahamsen 2000: 146-47). While the elected Cameroonian govern-
ment has frequently tried to avoid, postpone, manipulate and dilute privatisations, which tend to 
further undermine the patronage networks on which its power continues to rest and the limited 
legitimacy it still enjoys among the electorate, its dependence on continued financial assistance 
has eventually led it to fall into line with the demands of its external constituency. Civil-society 
organisations in Cameroon that have either emerged or obtained a large measure of autonomy 
during political liberalisation are usually completely excluded from the decision-making process 
about neo-liberal reforms and have often displayed strong opposition to privatisation. Interest-
ingly, in the absence of any powerful opposition parties in the Cameroonian democratic transition, 
newly created ethno-regional associations have come to serve as the new intermediaries between 
the state and the electorate (Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998; Kasfir 1998). Their leadership is 
determined to represent and defend ethno-regional interests during structural adjustment and 
often strives for a larger degree of ethno-regional autonomy and self-determination. 
 In this article I focus on the vehement resistance of ethno-regional associations to 
the government announcement on 15 July 1994 of the privatisation of the Cameroon Devel-
opment Corporation (CDC), a huge agro-industrial parastatal located in the coastal area of 
Anglophone Cameroon. These organisations perceived the announced privatisation of this 
important regional parastatal as a further step towards ethno-regional marginalisation. 
 
 
 
Governance and privatisation in Cameroon 
 
As in most other African countries (Grosh & Makandala 1994; Tangri 1999), the parastatal 
sector in Cameroon has grown rapidly since independence (Tedga 1990; Van de Walle 1994; 
Walker 1998). From a handful of public enterprises inherited from the British and French 
Trust Authorities at independence and reunification in 1961, the Cameroonian parastatal 
sector grew to 219 enterprises in the mid-1980s, employing approximately 100,000 people. 
Growth in public-sector ownership was the result of a series of economic and political factors, 
in particular statist conceptions of development, economic nationalism, and the need for 
political patronage (Tangri 1999: 19-22). 
 The 1960s was a period when ‘statism’ was a key feature of development thinking 
and strategy on the continent. The view that the state should be the prime motor of devel-
opment was widely shared, and ownership and intervention by the state was accepted as the 
dominant development paradigm. State entrepreneurship was also strongly supported by 
western donors. For example, the enormous expansion of the Cameroonian agro-industrial 
parastatal sector in the post-colonial period was largely financed by the World Bank and 
other international financial institutions (Konings 1993: 26). 
 Public-sector expansion was also encouraged by the fact that, at independence, 
Africa’s economies were characterised by a weak and subordinate indigenous private sector 
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and foreign control. Most post-colonial governments tried to forestall the development of a 
national bourgeoisie, which they regarded as a potential political threat, and to reduce for-
eign dominance. Attaining greater ownership and control of the ‘commanding heights of the 
economy’ would enable them to influence the broad direction of national development. Sub-
sequently, the parastatal sector came to be viewed as ‘national patrimony’ and its sale to 
foreigners was regarded negatively. 
 And, last but not least, state expansion afforded prebendal and patronage possibili-
ties and was seen by the African political elite as a valuable mechanism in the consolidation 
and maintenance of political power. According to Van de Walle (1994: 155-56), public enter-
prises in Cameroon ‘proved to be an ideal instrument to distribute state resources in the form 
of jobs, rents, power and prestige’, enabling the president to reward allies and co-opt oppo-
nents, and thus ‘secure his own power base’. A ‘patrimonial logic’ existed in many African 
post-colonial states (Chabal & Daloz 1999) but was particularly forceful in Cameroon, a 
country with stark ethno-regional cleavages (Mehler 1993; Nyamnjoh 1999; Gabriel 1999). 
State resources could be used to forge the ethno-regional alliances necessary for national 
unity and political stability and to obviate the need for coercion. The political importance of 
state-owned enterprises is evident from the fact that the Cameroonian government used to 
subsidise parastatal-sector losses to the tune of some FCFA 150 billion a year prior to the 
start of the economic crisis in the mid-1980s. Though many of Cameroon’s oil revenues were 
initially kept in secret bank accounts abroad, their primary function soon became the covering 
of parastatal deficits.  
 By virtually any measure of economic performance, the record of state-owned con-
cerns has proved disappointing. Although by no means uniformly negative in their perform-
ance, public enterprises have been judged inefficient and unprofitable. The Cameroonian 
government itself has regularly recognised the operating ineffectiveness of its parastatals but 
little noticeable improvement in public enterprises has occurred (Konings 1993: 27). Re-
markably, the international financiers who made a major contribution to parastatal expansion 
failed to raise any serious alarm about the dismal performance of Cameroonian public enter-
prises for a long time. This may be explained by the fact that they, like others, were im-
pressed by the general performance of the Cameroonian economy which was viewed as one 
of the rare success stories in Africa, registering a phenomenal growth rate of 6-7 per cent 
between 1970 and 1986 (Konings 1996). It was not until the unprecedented crisis in the 
Cameroonian economy in 1987 that the World Bank began to express its disillusionment with 
the performance of state enterprises (World Bank 1987). Subsequently, in 1988/89, the 
Bretton Woods institutions forced the reluctant Biya government to adopt an SAP, making 
privatisation a cornerstone of their lending conditions. 
Privatisation intended to achieve at least three things. First, it would contribute to 
solving the problem of rising budgetary deficits and in the process also generate revenue 
that could be used to pay off government debts. With few exceptions, state-owned enter-
prises had been operating at a loss. In 1984, they had operating losses of FCFA 65 billion, 
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representing 1.5 per cent of GDP; the following year losses increased to FCFA 121 billion or 
3 per cent of GDP. The situation continued to deteriorate. Between 1989 and 1994, state-
owned enterprises accumulated debts of an additional FCFA 352 billion, bringing their total to 
over FCFA 750 billion or 22 per cent of GDP (Walker 1998: 263). Second, it would contribute 
to the depoliticisation of the economy through the dismantlement of state redistributive and 
welfare activities, which were lumped together as ‘neo-patrimonial’ or rent-seeking practices. 
These practices were held responsible for the various shortcomings of state-owned enter-
prises, in particular widespread corruption, political interference, political appointments, weak 
monitoring and overstaffing. Privatisation was thought to lead to greater transparency and 
accountability, to increase efficiency in the allocation of resources and to stimulate more 
economic competitiveness, all of which were expected to promote greater total factor produc-
tivity in the national economy. Third, it would contribute to the promotion of private enterprise 
and attract badly needed foreign capital. Generally speaking, privatisation could produce a 
desirable change in the balance of power between the state and the private sector. 
 Public-enterprise reform and private-sector development have been designed in the 
offices of the Bretton Woods institutions. Like other structural adjustment measures, they 
have been accepted by virtually all bilateral donors and presented to African governments as 
the only way forward to development and economic growth. Even since the Biya government 
was compelled in 1990 to introduce a certain measure of political liberalisation, including a 
multi-party system and a limited degree of freedom of press and association, there has been 
little local participation in the actual formulation of privatisation schemes. The degree of 
control exerted by donors and creditors, especially the Bretton Woods institutions, on these 
new democracies poses a challenge to key features of liberal democracy as commonly con-
ceived in political theory in that it threatens to erode the right to national self-determination 
and self-government. Mkandawire (1999) has coined the term ‘choiceless democracies’ to 
refer to democracies where the fine-tuning of externally directed policies is the best that can 
be hoped for.  
 Remarkably, although donors are able to design and impose structural adjustment 
measures upon African governments, they appear to have less control over their actual 
implementation. There is considerable research and empirical evidence to suggest that Afri-
can governments may sign documents initiating a privatisation programme without intending 
to ever execute it (Bennell 1997; Tangri 1999; Van de Walle 2001). For these government 
leaders, the need to continue financial assistance flows obliges acquiescence to donor de-
mands but the realities of the domestic political economy limit what is politically feasible. 
Under these circumstances, a strategy of initial acceptance followed by delay and obstruction 
may be the most effective. Privatisation, in fact, represents a severe challenge to the neo-
patrimonial logic of the Cameroonian regime which laid a solid foundation for co-opting the 
various ethno-regional elite factions into the ‘hegemonic alliance’ (Bayart 1979) and thus 
secures a considerable measure of political stability in the post-colonial state. 
 One of the defensive tactics of Cameroonian government leaders has been the at-
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tempt to privatise state corporations and put them in their cronies’ hands (Hibou 1999). 
Similar to other African countries (cf. Tangri & Mwenda 2001), the privatisation process in 
Cameroon thus reinforced patterns of patron-client relations, which the exercise itself was 
supposed to eliminate. Little wonder then that the donors, including the World Bank, have 
recently expressed concerns about the politicisation of economic reforms (World Bank 1997, 
2000). Another tactic has been what Van de Walle (1993) has called ‘the politics of non-
reform’. In 1991, a World Bank mission provided an overview of the disappointing state of the 
Cameroonian government’s efforts to reform and sell off state-owned enterprises: the delay 
in establishing government agencies to oversee the process, the government’s reluctance to 
sell off anything but bankrupt or inconsequential enterprises, the in-fighting over which firms 
would be the first to be sold or liquidated, and the foot-dragging over issuing tenders and 
establishing the criteria by which bids would be evaluated (Walker 1998: 4). Again, in its 
1994 report Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead, the World Bank 
asserted that in the area of privatisation, little progress had been made in Cameroon. The 
report constantly rated Cameroon on the bottom rungs of economic policy and adjustment 
performance, and it pointed out that the IMF had signed and cancelled three successive 
stand-by agreements because of the government’s failure to achieve negotiated targets 
(World Bank 1994). 
 The slow progress of the privatisation programme is clearly manifest in the actual 
number of privatisations that were executed between 1989 and 1996. To fulfill the terms of 
the structural adjustment loan negotiated between the Cameroonian government and the 
World Bank in 1989, the Cameroonian government completed an initial review of the parasta-
tal sector over the following year, that culminated in a presidential decree in October 1990 
designating an initial set of 15 enterprises (7 per cent of the total of 219) that were to be 
sold off. In July 1994, a second presidential decree added an additional 15 enterprises to the 
group destined for divestiture, most of them in the agro-industrial and transport sectors, 
including the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). However, as of mid-1996 only 10 of 
the 30 enterprises on the divestiture list had actually been sold. Under mounting pressure 
from the Bretton Woods institutions, the Cameroonian government has displayed a firmer 
commitment to accelerate the privatisation process from 1997 onwards. 
 While African governments have often tried to postpone or dilute the imposed privati-
sation programmes, civil-society organisations have frequently opposed their implementation 
as being harmful to their members’ interests and have demanded a voice in the decision-
making process (Olukoshi 1998; Konings 2002). One of the privatisations in Cameroon that 
sparked off virulent opposition from ethno-regional associations and pressure groups was 
that of the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), whose estates are located in the 
coastal area of Anglophone Cameroon.  
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Privatisation of the CDC and Ethno-Regional Opposition 
 
The CDC is one of the country’s oldest enterprises (Ardener et al. 1960; Konings 1993) and 
its history is closely linked with the political and economic history of Anglophone Cameroon. It 
was founded in 1946 but its roots can be traced back to the German colonial period (1884-
1916) when many large-scale private plantations were created on the fertile, volcanic soils 
around Mount Cameroon in the present South West Province of Anglophone Cameroon. The 
establishment of a plantation economy in the region led to the expulsion of the original occu-
pants of the land, notably the Bakweri (Matute 1990; Ardener 1996), into prescribed native 
reserves. With the British occupation in 1914/15, the property of German planters was con-
fiscated and turned over to the Custodian of Enemy Property. By 1922, however, the British 
Mandate Authority had already decided to get rid of them, as the administrative costs of 
maintaining them were said to be prohibitive. It then seriously considered returning the plan-
tation lands to the original owners but dropped the idea in the end. Instead, it came to the 
conclusion that it would be in the best interests of the territory and its inhabitants to put the 
plantations back in the hands of foreign private enterprise. At an auction held in London in 
November 1924, almost all the estates were bought back by their former German owners. 
 At the start of the Second World War, the German estates were again expropriated by 
the Custodian of Enemy Property. After the war, a decision had to be reached, once again, on 
how to dispose of the properties. The Bakweri chiefs and educated elite, organised in the so-
called Bakweri Land Committee (BLC), immediately began agitating for the return of their 
ancestral lands. The BLC sent several petitions, first to the British Crown and subsequently to 
the United Nations, as Britain had assumed responsibility for the territory, the so-called 
Southern Cameroons, under United Nations Trusteeship after the war. However, after consid-
erable deliberations, the British Trusteeship Authority declined once again to surrender the 
ex-German plantation lands to their original owners (Molua 1985; Konings 1993). Instead, it 
announced in November 1946 that they would be leased to a newly established statutory 
corporation, the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). 
 The corporation came into being with the passage of two ordinances in December 
1946. The first ordinance, the Ex-Enemy Lands (Cameroons) Ordinance no. 38 (1946), 
provided for the acquisition of the ex-German plantation lands which had been vested in the 
Custodian of Enemy Property for the duration of the Second World War. Under the terms of 
this ordinance, the governor of Nigeria, who was responsible for the administration of the 
Southern Cameroons, was to declare them ‘native lands’ and hold them in trust for the com-
mon benefit of all the inhabitants of the territory. The second ordinance, the Cameroons 
Development Corporation Ordinance no. 39 (1946), provided for the setting up of the corpo-
ration. All the lands acquired by the governor under the first ordinance were to be leased to 
this corporation for a period of sixty years. Significantly, the corporation was charged with a 
double responsibility: it was to develop and manage the approximately 104,000 hectares of 
estate lands in the interests of the people of the Trust Territory, and to provide for the spiri-
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tual, educational and social welfare of its employees.  
 The CDC is still the largest agro-industrial parastatal in the country. It is one of the 
few agro-industrial enterprises in the world that specialises in a variety of crops – the four 
major ones being rubber, palm oil, tea and bananas. With the help of huge loans from several 
well-known financial institutions, including the World Bank, the International Development 
Association (IDA), the European Development Fund (EDF), the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation (Comdev) and the French Caisse Centrale de Coopé ration É conomique (CCCE), it 
expanded its area under cultivation from 20,000 to 42,000 hectares following the achieve-
ment of independence and reunification in 1961. It is, after the government, the largest 
employer in the country, with a current labour force of about 14,500 (Konings 1993). 
 Above all, the CDC has made a major contribution to regional development in Anglo-
phone Cameroon. It has created employment for both men and women, has constructed 
numerous roads, supplied water and electricity, built and staffed schools, awarded a substan-
tial number of scholarships, provided medical care for a large proportion of the local popula-
tion, and has stimulated the supply of goods and services to itself and its workers. It played a 
key role in the commercialisation and modernisation of peasant production in the 1950s and 
in the establishment of regional smallholders’ oil-palm and rubber schemes since the early 
1960s (Ardener 1958; Konings 1993). Of late, it has handed over a substantial part of its 
oil-palm plantations to local contractors. As a result, the CDC has been called the economic 
lifeline of Anglophone Cameroon.  
 It is therefore not surprising that when the government announced the privatisation 
of this important agro-industrial enterprise on 15 July 1994, Anglophones were deeply in-
censed. One Anglophone columnist, Mr Jing Thomas, captured the essence of Anglophone 
sentiments: 
 
The CDC is unlike any other corporation. It means native lands, especially those of the 
Bakweri. It means jobs for Cameroonians, especially the Anglophones. It is a symbol of 
Anglophone survival against all odds.... If the CDC falls.... the last act of internal colonisa-
tion would have been completed.1i 
 
The announced privatisation of the CDC was all the more shocking to the Anglophone popula-
tion since the CDC (i) had been one of the very few public enterprises in Cameroon to per-
form relatively well until the economic crisis; (ii) had been able to survive this crisis mainly 
because the management and workers had agreed to adopt a series of drastic adjustment 
measures aimed at reducing costs and increasing productivity; and (iii) was on the way to 
economic recovery following the 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA franc in early 1994 that 
made CDC products more competitive on the world market (Konings 1995a). It prompted 
vehement protest actions in Anglophone Cameroon from various ethno-regional associations 
                                                          
1  Fako International, vol. 1, no. 2 (January), 1995, p. 18 
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and pressure groups that had been either created or granted a large measure of autonomy 
in the wake of political liberalisation in December 1990.  
 The following ethno-regional organisations have been the most active. First, there are 
the various Anglophone associations that since 1993 have been operating under an umbrella 
organisation, the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). They claim that the Anglo-
phone minority has been exposed to Francophone domination, assimilation and exploitation 
since independence and reunification in 1961. While most of them initially demanded a return 
to a two-state (Anglophone-Francophone) federal state, the Biya government’s persistent 
refusal to enter into any meaningful negotiations forced them to adopt a secessionist stand 
and pursue the creation of an independent Southern Cameroons state (cf. Konings & 
Nyamnjoh 1997, 2000; Eyoh 1998a). The government announcement of the CDC privatisa-
tion was seen by these Anglophone associations as a further step in the dismantling of the 
Anglophone colonial legacy by the Francophone-dominated state. As a consequence, they 
called upon Anglophones to forget about any internal differences and form a united front 
against attempts to sell the CDC to Francophone or French interests. 
 Besides the Anglophone associations, there were also the associations of the elite 
and chiefs in the South West Province of Anglophone Cameroon where most of the CDC es-
tates are located. The most prominent South West associations were the South West Elite 
Association (SWELA) and the South West Chiefs’ Conference (SWECC). There is some overlap 
between these organisations, with some important South West chiefs also being members of 
SWELA (Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998; Eyoh 1998b). Both associations seek to promote the 
South West Province’s socio-economic and cultural revival. The South West was to be re-
stored to its former glory after having been marginalised by the Francophone-dominated 
state and subjected to the ‘imperialist’ tendencies of the population of the other Anglophone 
province, the North West Province. Although both organisations supported most of the An-
glophone grievances about Francophone domination, they equally claimed that the South 
West had been more disadvantaged than the North West in the post-colonial state in terms of 
distribution of strategic posts. Moreover, they stressed that the South West plantation econ-
omy had been massively invaded by North West migrants who had come to form the majority 
of the workers and managers on the plantations and even of the urban population in South 
West towns. They accused the North West ‘settlers’ of dominating and exploiting their prov-
ince by ‘grabbing the best land’ and controlling the regional administration, business and 
trade (Konings 2001). This situation has often given rise to rivalry and conflict between the 
South West and North West elite. The South West elite and chiefs particularly feared that the 
newly created Anglophone movements’ pursuit of either a return to a two-state federation or 
outright secession would lead to renewed South West domination by the entrepreneurial 
North West majority. They were, therefore, inclined to champion a ten-state federal system 
based on the existing ten provinces in Cameroon, which would retain the present separation 
between the South West and the North West Provinces, thus safeguarding the former’s 
autonomy. 
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 Despite such internal rivalries and conflicts within the Anglophone community, the 
South West elite and chiefs favoured a (temporary) alliance with the leadership of the Anglo-
phone movements when the privatisation of the CDC was announced. This alliance was justi-
fied on the grounds of the corporation’s immense contribution to the welfare and develop-
ment of the Anglophone community as a whole. 
 And finally there was the Bakweri Land Committee (BLC), the organisation of the 
Bakweri chiefs and elite in Fako Division of the South West Province, whose main goal has 
continued to be the retrieval of their ancestral lands that were expropriated under German 
colonial rule for the purpose of plantation production and later, in 1946, leased by the British 
Trusteeship Authority to the CDC. The BLC felt particularly aggrieved by the announced priva-
tisation of the CDC. It felt betrayed at not having been previously consulted about the corpo-
ration’s privatisation and it warned the government that the CDC lands were Bakweri lands 
and thus could not be sold to non-natives without Bakweri consent and compensation. The 
BLC is being supported in its current struggles by both the South West and Anglophone 
associations. 
 In addition to the Anglophone and South West associations, there were other civil-
society organisations in the region that resisted the privatisation of the CDC. The most impor-
tant was the Fako Agricultural Workers’ Union (FAWU) that is responsible for the representa-
tion and defence of the CDC workers’ interests (Konings 1993, 1995a). Its president, Mr 
C.P.N. Vewessee, is one of the most prominent trade-union leaders in Cameroon, having 
played a significant role in the achievement of a large measure of trade-union autonomy in 
1992. He insisted that the CDC could not be privatised without the FAWU being consulted, 
arguing that the workers had made personal sacrifices during the economic crisis to assist 
the corporation’s recovery by accepting drastic cuts in salaries and fringe benefits and con-
tributing to a compulsory savings scheme. Moreover, the union, he said, would resist any 
mass lay-offs and/or deterioration in the workers’ conditions of service as a result of privati-
sation (Konings 1995a).  
 And, finally, the Anglophone press has strongly condemned the announced privatisa-
tion. It has continued to defend the Anglophone cause and to inform the Anglophone popula-
tion of the issues at stake. 
 
 
 
Ethno-Regional Protest Actions against CDC Privatisation 
 
Following the government announcement of the CDC privatisation on 15 July 1994, all exist-
ing ethno-regional associations and opposition parties rallied to form a united front to resist 
the government’s decision. They alleged that privatisation of the CDC was ‘an ill-disguised 
plot to hand over the corporation to the French and the Francophones’ or ‘a plan by Biya to 
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compensate his “tribesmen” and allies with a slice of the parastatal cake’.2 There were pro-
test marches in Anglophone towns organised by SWELA and the Anglophone associations. 
Protesters carried banners with slogans such as ‘France: Hands off Anglophones’ and ‘Hands 
off or we will burn the plantations’. The National Executive of the Cameroon Anglophone 
Movement (CAM), the most important Anglophone association, met on 30-31 July 1994 and 
condemned the CDC privatisation as a declaration of war against the people of Southern 
Cameroons and called upon Anglophones to observe 16 August as a day of protest and 
solidarity with the CDC.3 SWELA thereupon declared 12 August as another day of solidarity 
with the CDC. Despite a ban on demonstrations on its solidarity day and a heavy police pres-
ence, a determined group of SWELA members led by Secretary-General Martin Nkemngu 
marched successfully to the governor’s office where they presented a protest memorandum 
for the attention of the head of state.4 At a press conference in Limbe on 20 August, the 
FAWU president, Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, declared that the union and the workers were totally 
against the dubious privatisation of the CDC. Since the workers had a joint financial stake in 
the corporation amounting to FCFA 5.5 billion, the privatisation could only be enforced on 
terms acceptable to the majority of the workers.5  
 Unsurprisingly, the most vehement opposition in Anglophone Cameroon came from 
landowners. As soon as the privatisation of the CDC was announced, the Bakweri chiefs and 
elite mobilised to revive the moribund BLC and to adopt a common position with regard to 
the privatisation, which had been planned without any consideration having been given to the 
Bakweri land problem. Soon thereafter, the BLC was renamed the Bakweri Land Claims Com-
mittee (BLCC). 
 On 23 July 1994, the Bakweri chiefs and elite met in Buea under the chairmanship of 
Paramount Chief S.M.L. Endeley of Buea and Paramount Chief F. Bille Manga Williams of 
Limbe to discuss the implications of the government’s decision. After lengthy and passionate 
discussions, an ad hoc committee was elected by acclamation to assist the BLCC in preparing 
a detailed memorandum on the Bakweri position to be presented to the government and all 
other interested parties.6 
 Over 500 Bakweri chiefs, notables and elite gathered at the Buea Youth Cultural and 
Animation Center on 4 August 1994 and approved the memorandum drawn up by the ad hoc 
committee. In the memorandum, the Bakweri vehemently opposed the announced privatisa-
tion on the grounds that the CDC lands were Bakweri lands and thus could not be sold to 
non-natives without Bakweri consent and compensation.7 The memorandum was later pre-
                                                          
2  New African, no. 326 (January), 1995, p. 25; and Africa International, nos 279/280 (January-February),  
   1995, p. 39 
3  CAM, ‘Communiqué  of the Enlarged Ex-Bureau Meeting, 30-31 July 1994 (mimeo); and CAM, ‘CAM Resolution on 
the Privatisation of the CDC’, 30-31 July 1994 (mimeo) 
4  The Herald, 18-21 August 1994, p. 7 
5  Cameroon Post, 6-19 September 1994, p. 9 
6  Fako International, vol. 1, no. 2 (January 1995), pp. 14-16 
7  Memorandum of the Bakweri People on the Presidential Decree to Privatise or Sell the Cameroon Development 
Corporation, Buea, 27 July 1994 
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sented to the provincial governor for onward transmission to President Biya. At the end of 
this historic meeting, the eminent Bakweri scholar and secretary of the ad hoc committee, 
Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale, was designated counsel for the Bakweri people with instructions 
to present their case before the United Nations and other international fora.  
 The Bakweri case was strongly supported by the Anglophone movements. A power-
fully worded petition to the head of state, co-signed by the Anglophone movements and the 
Bakweri chiefs, reiterated that the Bakweri had never relinquished ownership of the CDC lands 
and that the corporation could not be sold without Bakweri consent. It pointed out that the 
Bakweri had never been paid royalties for the use of their lands since the creation of the CDC 
in 1946 and also stressed that the Bakweri were not inclined to renew the 60-year CDC 
lease, thus reclaiming the CDC lands after its expiry in 2007. 
 Concerned about the mounting anger in the Anglophone region in general and the 
Bakweri community in particular, the Biya government decided to send a delegation of high-
ranking Anglophone allies to the South West Province to appease the population. The delega-
tion was led by Chief Ephraim Inoni, the deputy secretary-general at the presidency, and the 
Chief of Bakingili, a village located on the territory of a Bakweri subgroup. The delegation met 
a number of Bakweri representatives in Buea to discuss the land problem. Though speaking 
on behalf of the government, Chief Inoni appealed to the Bakweri representatives not to 
forget that he was one of them. He acknowledged that there should have been prior contact 
between the government and the Bakweri before the announcement of the corporation’s 
privatisation but he denied the widespread rumours in Anglophone Cameroon that the French 
and some high-ranking Francophones had masterminded the whole operation. While admit-
ting that the financial situation of the corporation had improved after the 1994 devaluation of 
the CFA franc, he argued that privatisation would enable the corporation to obtain new capital 
for necessary investments in production and processing. The Bakweri Paramount Chief S.M.L. 
Endeley, who had always been a staunch supporter of the regime until the Bakweri land issue 
arose,8 then took the floor. Amid thunderous applause he declared that he as the custodian 
of the ancestral lands and the Bakweri population as a whole were against the privatisation of 
the CDC. He requested that Chief Inoni report this to President Biya: 
 
We are in a country where we like to cheat ourselves, where government hands decisions 
through dictatorship... We say no, no [to privatisation], go and tell Mr Biya that he cannot 
afford to go down in history as the man who sold the CDC.9 
 
                                                          
8 Chief S.M.L. Endeley is a brother of Dr E.M.L. Endeley and Mr D.M.L. Endeley  who were leading figures in the 
BLC.  He is a retired  Chief Justice who acted,  among others,  as chairman of the ruling party,  the Cameroon 
People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM),  in Fako Division  and chairman of the CDC  before  being appointed 
Paramount Chief of Buea in 1992. For his career, see Gwellem, J.F. (1985) Cameroon Year Book 1985/86, 
Limbe: Gwellem Publications: 113-14 
9  Cited in Fako International, vol. 1, no. 2 (January 1995), p. 16 
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 After the government delegation returned to Yaoundé , no further government action 
took place concerning CDC privatisation but this apparent victory for Anglophone resistance 
turned out to be short-lived. In 1997 rumours of an imminent privatisation of the CDC be-
came more and more persistent. In conformity with the agreement concluded with the IMF 
and the World Bank within the framework of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) in 1997, the privatisation of the CDC was expected to be launched soon. That the 
government, under severe pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions, was preparing the 
ground for the privatisation of the CDC could be seen from the speeches and interviews of 
leading government and CDC officials at the opening ceremony of the corporation’s golden-
jubilee celebration in Bota-Victoria on 1 December 1997. For example, on that occasion the 
CDC deputy general manager, Mr Richard Grey, revealed that the highly reputable interna-
tional consultancy firm Coopers and Lybrand had already been selected by the World Bank 
and the government to carry out a study into the privatisation of the CDC that would be com-
pleted by 30 June 1998.10  
 The CDC was finally put up for sale in January 1999. The leadership of the Anglo-
phone movements immediately warned prospective CDC buyers to desist from investing in the 
purchase of the CDC. At a meeting with South Western members of parliament and govern-
ment, the Bakweri chiefs and elite denounced the privatisation of the CDC saying that the 
latter’s acceptance of the CDC sale ‘was tantamount to a betrayal of their people’.11 The BLCC 
officially wrote to President Biya on behalf of the Bakweri people on 3 March 1999 request-
ing that it be included in the privatisation negotiations and that compensation be paid for the 
use of Bakweri lands. When rumours spread that various multinational companies like Fruit-
iers/Dole, Chiquita and Del Monte were already negotiating with individual government offi-
cials about the purchase of the whole or parts of the CDC at throwaway prices, the Bakweri in 
the diaspora once again addressed the head of state on 1 October 1999 in support of the 
BLCC position.12  
 Since no reply was forthcoming from the presidency, the BLCC, strongly supported by 
South West associations, like SWELA and SWECC, decided to raise national and international 
awareness by starting a high-profile public-relations campaign through the writing of open 
letters, petitions and newspaper articles and the use of the Internet. For this purpose, an 
interim bureau of the BLCC was set up in the United States in May 2000 to establish an 
effective, active and visible BLCC presence within the Bakweri and Cameroonian diaspora 
community and to open permanent lines of communication with all potential buyers of the 
CDC, donor agencies, NGOs and foreign governments directly or indirectly involved in the sale 
of the CDC. The BLCC-USA became very vocal, creating its own website on the Internet.13 Its 
first action was to send a memorandum to the managing director of the IMF, Mr Horst Kö hler, 
on 16 June 2000. In this memorandum, it warned him about the growing unrest among the 
                                                          
10  The Post, 5 December 1997, pp. 1-2 
11  Isaha’a Boh Cameroon, Bulletin no. 405 
12  See Letter from the Bakweri around the World to President Paul Biya of Cameroon, dated 1 October 1999 
13  See http://www.bakwerilands.org. Most of the documents quoted in this study can be found on this website 
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Bakweri and threatened legal action should the privatisation of the CDC be pursued without 
BLCC involvement: 
 As the current impasse in Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrates, land expropriated 
from African natives by European colonialists a century ago is the source of much contempo-
rary unrest and instability. All Cameroonians of goodwill bear witness that the Bakweri people 
have over the years opted for a peaceful resolution of the CDC Bakweri land problem. How-
ever, should the privatisation of the CDC go ahead without the input of the Bakweri on whose 
land most of the corporation’s agro-industrial activities are located, we preserve the right to 
seek legal redress against the government of the Republic of Cameroon, the IMF, the World 
Bank as well as all lessees who derive title to the land by whatever means, in any country of 
the world where such bodies are located.14 
 This was followed by massive pro-BLCC demonstrations in New York and Washington 
during the September 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit that was attended by a huge 
Cameroonian delegation led by President Paul Biya. As a result of these demonstrations and a 
flurry of other pro-BLCC activities on this occasion, the embarrassed Cameroonian delegation, 
along with leading donor agencies, were able to gauge the high levels of support for the BLCC 
within the entire Cameroonian diaspora community in the United States.  
 In a press release on 5 August 2000, the BLCC revealed that it was going to take its 
campaign for land restitution and compensation ‘a notch higher’ by seeking consultative status 
within the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It believed that the granting of 
consultative status would provide it with a global platform to proclaim its struggle for land rights, 
‘bringing it into contact with other NGOs which claim to represent the interests of indigenous 
groups from around the world as well as with sympathetic UN members who have championed 
the cause of dispossessed people on the floor of the General Assembly and at the numerous 
ECOSOC meetings over the years’.15 Soon afterwards, on 21 August 2000, the BLCC counsel, 
Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale, was invited by the United Nations to make a representation on the 
Bakweri lands issue to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva. 
 Following the government’s renewed call for tenders for the sale of the CDC in September 
2000, the BLCC cautioned prospective buyers in an open letter as follows: “It is our duty to 
advise you to think twice before you commit the resources of your shareholders in a venture that 
is still mired in controversy and whose promised financial and economic rewards may prove to be 
illusory in the long run”.16 
 It became increasingly evident that the BLCC was finding it hard to defend Bakweri inter-
ests at the national level after ‘their own son’, Peter Mafany Musonge, the then general manager 
of the CDC, was appointed prime minister in 1996. Without doubt, one of the main reasons for his 
                                                          
14  Letter from Dr Lyombe Eko, Executive Director of BLCC-USA, to Mr Horst Kö hler, Managing Director of the IMF, 
dated 16 June 2000 
15  Press Release no. blc/us/05/08/00, The BLCC to seek consultative status at the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) 
16  BLCC, Open Letter to All Prospective Buyers of CDC Plantations, Buea, 12 October 2000 
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appointment to this position was that President Biya regarded him, being an ex-CDC general 
manager and a Bakweri, as the most suitable candidate to handle the delicate issue of CDC 
privatisation. 
 The appointment of Musonge initially raised high expectations among the Bakweri. They 
were convinced that their son would pay particular attention to the land question and take Bak-
weri interests into consideration during any eventual sale of the CDC. Their expectations appeared 
to have a solid foundation because, in his former capacity as CDC general manager, Musonge had 
publicly declared during a 1994 radio interview that any privatisation of the CDC should be ‘not 
only economically effective but also socially equitable’. For that reason, indigenous landowners, 
workers and investors would be directly involved in this endeavour.17 Once appointed prime 
minister however, he came under immense pressure from the IMF and his master, Paul Biya, to 
champion the economic advantages of CDC privatisation and to forget about the payment of 
compensation to Bakweri landowners. This put the Bakweri in an awkward position. On the one 
hand, they refused to withdraw their claims to the CDC lands. On the other hand, however, they 
fully realised that they were obliged to operate carefully in this matter so as not to undermine 
Musonge’s post as prime minister, which they saw as a key to prebendal politics and Bakweri 
socio-economic development. 
 Unable to convince his ethnic group to give up its claim to compensation, Musonge is 
reported to have resorted to intimidation, using the Buea sub-prefect and the Fako prefect to 
that end. In March 2000, the Buea sub-prefect, Mr Aboubakar Njikam, banned a BLCC general 
assembly meeting for which he had earlier given his approval. The prime minister appears quickly 
to have ordered a halt to the meeting when he learnt that compensation was high on the agenda 
but he failed to intimidate the committee, which eventually met on 15 April 2000. In June 2000, 
the Fako prefect, Jean-Robert Mengue Meka, accused it of being an illegal organisation and the 
committee was ordered to cease its activities. Two of the newly elected BLCC executives, Chief 
Peter Moky Efange (president) and Mola Njoh Litumbe (secretary-general), responded by telling 
Mengue Meka that he was acting illegally himself by claiming that the BLCC, which was founded as 
long ago as 1946, was an unlawful association. The prefect was reminded that the BLCC was a 
duly incorporated organisation that had been registered in accordance with the laws of the coun-
try and had been received by the South West governor in 1994 and could thus not now have its 
legality questioned.18 
 With the high profile publicity given to the BLCC both at home and abroad, the prime 
minister could no longer ignore the committee and its demands. He invited it to a working session 
in his Yaoundé  office and on 4 October 2000, the BLCC leadership met with Musonge, Chief 
Ephraim Inoni, the Bakweri deputy general secretary at the presidency and a number of other 
government officials. During this meeting Musonge conceded that the issues of land ownership 
and the payment of ground rents were legitimate demands but urged that these demands be 
                                                          
17  See Cameroon Post, 26 July-2 August 1994, pp. 12-13 
18  BLCC, The BLCC refuses to stand down in the face of threats from Fako administrative authorities, Buea, 15 
June 2000 
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pursued separately from the issue of privatisation. He argued that a hostile environment was 
being created by the BLCC protest campaign, which was scaring off potential investors.19 
  The BLCC delegation agreed with the prime minister that privatisation would be 
successful only in a peaceful atmosphere but it pointed out that the Bakweri protest actions, such 
as the UN Millennium Summit demonstrations, stemmed from a lack of government response to 
their pleas and representations. It stressed that Bakweri protest actions would inevitably continue 
until ‘justice, equity, and legitimate rights of the Bakweri were met’. The delegation then reiterated 
the main BLCC demands, namely: 
• that the government recognise that the lands occupied by the  CDC were  private  property as 
defined by Part II  of the 1974 Land Law and that the  Bakweri  were the legitimate owners of 
these lands; 
•  that the  Bakweri  be fully involved in the  CDC  privatisation  negotiations  to  ensure that 
their interests were effectively protected; 
•  that ground rents be paid to a Bakweri land trust fund; and 
• that the  Bakweri,  acting  jointly or  individually  be allocated a specific percentage of shares 
in each of the privatised sectors of the corporation.20 
 While the BLCC was trying to embark on a dialogue with local and national authorities, it continued 
to caution potential CDC buyers and the Bretton Woods institutions against any privatisation of 
the corporation without the involvement of the landowners. On 19 October 2001, a group of the 
Anglophone elite in the diaspora, including a large number of Bakweri, addressed a letter to the 
managing director of the IMF, in which they cautioned him against the perils of going ahead with 
the privatisation of the CDC without the involvement of the landowners: 
 
We hope that the IMF will not unwittingly become a signatory to what is certain to become an 
important public policy fiasco. As an organisation that supports and encourages transparency 
and accountability in all its dealings, we hope that the IMF will expect no less from Cameroon. 
The IMF must insist that proper consultation of the people, especially the relevant stakeholder 
groups, be undertaken before the future of this important agro-industrial complex is deter-
mined... The unilateral privatisation of the CDC without proper consultation ... cannot provide a 
viable and sustainable solution to the country’s economic problems.21 
 
                                                          
19  Through such manoeuvres, Musonge succeeded, albeit temporarily, in dividing the BLCC into two camps: on the 
one hand,  a majority  faction  led  by  its president, Chief  Efange,  which stood its ground,  and, on the other,  
a minority faction led  by the Bakweri  Paramount  Chief,  Sam  Endeley,  which was more sensitive to Mu-
songe’s  arguments.  The latter  accused  the new  BLCC executive of being too ‘radical’ and opposed its ongo-
ing Internet campaign on the CDC’s privatisation compensation. 
20  See Report of the Meeting of  Prime  Minister  Mafany  Musonge  with BLCC Delegation, Yaoundé , 4 October 
2000 
21  Seehttp://www.bakwerilands.org/land  problem.htm, ‘The Bakweri Land Problem: A Historical Review’ 
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To the consternation of the Anglophones in general and the Bakweri in particular, it was an-
nounced in October 2002 that the three CDC tea estates had been sold to a South African con-
sortium, Brobon Finex PTY Limited. One of these estates, the Tole Tea Estate, was located in the 
Bakweri area (Konings 1995b). Brobon Finex would run the tea sector under the name Camer-
oon Tea Estates (CTE). The BLCC immediately expressed its ‘total bewilderment’ at the sale of the 
CDC tea estates without any consultation or compensation of the landowners in spite of previous 
deliberations between the committee and the government.22 The secessionist umbrella organisa-
tion of the Anglophone movements, the SCNC, claimed that the Francophone-dominated state 
had ‘no locus standi whatsoever to privatise, sell or transfer the CDC Tole Tea Estate and the CDC 
Ndu Tea Estate located indisputably and exclusively within the territorial boundaries of the South-
ern Cameroons to the South African consortium Brobon Finex PTY or to any other person’.23 
 The privatisation of the CDC tea estates became a national scandal when evidence 
emerged that it was going to benefit only a handful of politically well-connected elites at the 
expense of the public treasury and the native landowners. From his own revelations, it became 
clear that this privatisation had been masterminded by John Niba Ngu, a former CDC general 
manager and minister of agriculture, who is generally known as a close friend of President Biya. 
He used both his technical knowledge and his many connections within the highest levels of the 
regime to design the privatisation of the CDC tea estates. While experts had conservatively esti-
mated the value of the estates at about FCFA 3.2 billion, Ngu managed to bring down the price to 
FCFA 1.5 billion. Less than three months later, the CTE sold tea worth FCFA 4.6 billion. In return 
for his excellent services, the CTE Board allocated Ngu 5 per cent of the company’s share capital 
and appointed him general manager with a monthly salary and fringe benefits amounting to FCFA 
4 million.24    
 There were also growing doubts about the takeover of the CDC tea estates by the South 
African consortium Brobon Finex. It became instead more and more evident that the real owner of 
the CTE was Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo, a rich Haussa-Fulani from the North West Province, 
who was apparently using Brobon Finex as a front. Danpullo is a well-known cattle rancher and 
businessman in Cameroon with an international network stretching as far as South Africa. He is 
also a member of the Central Committee of the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic 
Movement (CPDM). Interestingly, Danpullo had been previously involved in another privatisation 
scandal in Cameroon, namely the attempt to sell the Socié té  de Dé veloppement du Coton (SODE-
COTON), a huge parastatal in Northern Cameroon which was on the same privatisation list as the 
CDC in 1994. Danpullo was among the small group of politically well-connected elite, most of 
them originating from Northern Cameroon, who managed to buy the company at a give-away 
price. The deal was eventually cancelled by the government following popular outcry and inter-
vention by the external donors, in particular France and the World Bank (Takougang & Krieger 
1998: 169-80). Although Danpullo was not a signatory to the convention between the Cameroo-
                                                          
22  See The Herald, 21 October 2002. 
23  BSCNation, 1 November 2002, ‘Privatisation of the CDC or part thereof by La Ré publique du Cameroun is illegal   
and unacceptable’ 
24  The Herald, 27 February 2003 
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nian government and Brobon Finex, he paid the price for the takeover of the CDC tea estates to 
the public treasury and has been engaged in other financial transactions on behalf of the CTE. 
Investigations by the BLCC in South Africa found that Brobon Finex exists in name only and has 
no office premises. Its chairman, Derrick Garvie, is indeed known in South African business circles 
but not in connection with Brobon Finex. This raised suspicions that Brobon Finex was merely a 
straw company.25 
 In January 2003, the BLCC threatened to sue Brobon Finex PTY in South Africa for tres-
passing on Bakweri property without the prior knowledge of the owners. In addition, it has called 
upon the government to revoke the controversial privatisation of the CDC tea estates and ‘to 
open meaningful discussions with the BLCC with a view to achieving an equitable resolution of the 
Bakweri land problem’.26 Soon thereafter, Biya sent Chief Ephraim Inoni, the Bakweri assistant 
secretary-general at the presidency, on another delicate mission to appease the Bakweri chiefs. 
Following the failure of this mission and the growing evidence of various financial malpractices in 
the privatisation of the CDC tea estates, he instructed Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge and 
the security forces to investigate the matter.27 It would appear that he himself has serious ques-
tions to answer for personally authorising the transfer of CDC tea estates to his friends. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Privatisation has become a cornerstone of the good governance-structural adjustment linkage 
formulated by western donors and creditors and imposed upon African states. It is, in essence, 
an attempt to free state enterprises from ‘politics’, in particular from the government’s neo-
patrimonial logic that is seen as the basic cause of their malfunctioning, to introduce transpar-
ency, accountability and the rule of law in policy-making and implementation needed for the 
efficient operation of market forces, and to redirect the state away from being an entrepreneur to 
being a promoter of private enterprise.  
 This study seems to largely confirm widespread evidence that both African governments 
and civil-society organisations are inclined to oppose externally imposed privatisation schemes. 
Cameroonian government officials have constantly attempted to postpone and manipulate the 
implementation of such schemes, which challenge the patronage system that forms a stabilising 
and uniting factor in the weak nation-state, undermine their limited popular legitimacy, and pro-
voke ethno-regional protest. Although their heavy dependence on western donors for continued 
financial assistance eventually forced them to comply, they then attempted to sell state corpora-
tions to members of the ‘hegemonic alliance’ at give-away prices. The various ethno-regional 
                                                          
25  Ibid., 18 January 2003; and 27 February 2003 
26  Ibid., 8 January 2003 
27  Ibid., 27 February 2003 
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associations that have emerged in Anglophone Cameroon during political liberalisation have 
persistently contested any attempts to privatise the CDC. Having been excluded from the deci-
sion-making process, they have strongly protested against their loss of control over ancestral 
lands and regional parastatals, which they considered as a renewed onslaught by the Franco-
phone-dominated post-colonial state on their regional economic heritage.  
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Zusammenfassung  
 
Privatisierung ist ein wesentlicher Eckpfeiler im von westlichen Geldgebern und Glä ubigern formu-
lierten System von Struktur-Anpassungsprogramm und guter Regierungsfü hrung. Diese Fallstudie 
aus Kamerun zeigt deutlich, dass Privatisierungsprojekte hä ufig nicht in der Lage waren, bei Re-
formen im ö ffentlichen Sektor Transparenz und Verantwortlichkeit zu fö rdern oder größ ere Partizi-
pation der Zivilgesellschaft in den Entscheidungsprozessen zu erreichen. Hä ufig haben Privatisie-
rungsplä ne dagegen zu vehementen Protesten auf Seiten ethno-regionaler Organisationen ge-
fü hrt, insbesondere dann, wenn diese sich beim Verkauf bedeutender regionaler ö ffentlicher Un-
ternehmen an gutsituierte inlä ndische Firmen oder an Unternehmen in auslä ndischem Besitz aus-
geschlossen fü hlten. 
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Ré sumé  
 
La privatisation est devenue une pierre angulaire du systè me d’adaptation structurelle et de 
bonne administration formulé  par les pays occidentaux donneurs et cré diteurs. Cette é tude de 
cas mené e au Cameroun met en é vidence le fait que les projets de privatisation ne furent sou-
vent pas en mesure de promouvoir la transparence et le sens des responsabilité s dans le ca-
dre de ré formes du secteur public, ni une plus grande participation de la socié té  civile aux 
processus de dé cision. Bien souvent, les projets de privatisation ont au contraire dé clenché  
des protestations vé hé mentes de la part d’organisation ethniques ré gionales, surtout lorsque 
celles-ci se sentaient exclues lors de la vente d’entreprises publiques ré gionales d’inté rê t vital 
à  des entreprises camerounaises bien placé es ou à  des entreprises é trangè res.  
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